sort by
approximate search
1shortlisttitle datasearch history  
results search [or] ISN:0000000078378071 | 1 hits
Person
ISNI: 
0000 0000 7837 8071
Name: 
Eric Maskin (American economist)
Eric Maskin (Amerikaans econoom)
Eric Maskin (amerikansk ekonom)
Eric Maskin (amerikansk økonom)
Eric Maskin (amerykański ekonomista)
Eric Maskin (economista statunitense)
Eric Maskin (économiste américain)
Eric S. Maskin (US-amerikanischer Mathematiker und Wirtschaftswissenschaftler)
Eric Stark Maskin
Ericus Stark Maskin
Erik Meskin
Maskin
Maskin, E.
Maskin, Eric
Maskin, Eric S.
Maskin, Eric Stark
Έρικ Μάσκιν (Αμερικανός οικονομολόγος)
Ерик Маскин
Ерік Мескін
Эрик Мэскин
Эрык Мэскін
ერიკ მასკინი
Էրիք Մեսքին
אריק מסקין
إيريك ماسكين
ارک ماسکن
اریک ماسکین (اقتصاددان آمریکایی)
ایرک ماسکن
এরিক মাসকিন (American economist)
எரிக் மாஸ்க்கின்
매스킨, 에릭
에릭 매스킨
エリック・マスキン
埃里克·马斯金
Dates: 
1950-
Creation class: 
article
cre
Language material
text
Creation role: 
author
contributor
editor
researcher
Related names: 
and, D. Fudenberg E. Maskin
Arrow, Kenneth Joseph (1921-)
Baliga, Sandeep
Banerjee, A.V.
Banerjee, Abhijit V
Barrett, Scott
Bessen, James
Bos, Wouter van den
Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE) / China Economics and Management Academy
Chen, Mark A.
Dasgupta, P.
Dasgupta, Partha
Dasgupta, Partha S
Dewatripont, M
Dewatripont, M.
Dewatripont, Mathias
Diamond, P.
Diamond, P. A.
Diamond, Peter
Diamond, Peter A.
Dubey, Pradeep
Eric, Joseph Farrell and Maskin
Evans, Robert
Farrell, Joseph
Fishburn, Peter C.
Fudenberg, D.
Fudenberg, Drew
Gehrlein, William V.
Grossman, Sanford J
Grossman, Sanford J.
Hammond, Peter
Hammond, Peter J
Hart, Oliver D
Hart, Oliver D.
Harvard University / Department of Economics / Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER)
Institute for Advanced Study / School of Social Science
Institute for Advanced Study Princeton, NJ Affiliation (see also from)
KORNAI, J.
Kornai, János
Kremer, M
Kremer, M.
Kremer, Michael
Kreps, D. M.
Kreps, David
Kreps, David M
Laffont, Jean-Jacques
Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1947-2004)
Lau, Tatiana
LEVINE, D.K.
Levine, David I
Levine, David K
Levine, David K.
Li, Jian
Mäler, Karl-Göran
Mäler, Karl-Göran (1939-..)
Maskin, E
MASKIN, E.
Maskin, E.S.
Maskin, Eric
Maskin, Eric S
Maskin, Eric S.
Moore, J.
Moore, John
Myerson, Roger
Myerson, Roger B.
Newbery, D.
Newbery, David
Newbery, David M
Princeton University / Department of Economics
Qian, Yingyi
Quan, Yingyi
Radner, Roy
Riley, J.
Riley, Joan G
Riley, John
Riley, John G
Riley, John G.
Roberts, Kevin
Roberts, Kevin W.S.
ROLAND, G.
Roland, Gérard
Sen, Amartya
Simonovits, András
Sjostrom, Tomas
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1943- ))
Tauman, Yair
Tirole, J
Tirole, J.
Tirole, Jean
Venturini, Andrea
Xu, Cheng-Gang
Xu, Chengagn
Xu, Chenggang
연세대학교 (isRelatedTo)
Titles: 
Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We Go From Here?, The
Asymmetric Auctions.
Auction Theory with Private Values*
Auctions and Efficiency
Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers
Auctions with Asymmetric Beliefs
Autobiography
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information
Bargaining and Destructive Power
Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments
celebration of Robert Aumann's achievements on the occasion of his 80th birthday, A
Centralized credit and long-term investment
Change everything creating an economy for the common good
Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods., A
Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design
Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information
Contractual contingencies and renegotiation
Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots: A Note
Corrigendum to 'A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III, Cournot Competition' (vol. 31, no. 4)
Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies
Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms., A
differential approach to incentive compatibility Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin
Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency.
Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn
Efficient Auctions.
Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market., The
Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games
Environment and development economics essays in honour of Sir Partha Dasgupta
Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States, An
equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract II. A non-steady state example, An
Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions.
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information'
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games.
Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games (based on work with D. Fudenberg)
Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria., An
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 1: Theory (Revised version now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.1-26.), The
Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 2: Applications (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.27-41.), The
Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory., The
Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications., The
Existence of Equilibrium with Price-Setting Firms., The
Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information, The
Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information, The
Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information., The
Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information., The
FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION., THE
Gains to Making Losers Pay in High Bid Auctions, The
imitacions que tenen un component creatiu també són bones per als països industrialitzats", "Les
"Imitations having a creative component are also good for industrialised countries"
Implementation and Renegotiation - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.39-56.)
Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium
Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility., The
Implementation theory
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form.
Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form - (Now published in Economics of Transition (2201)).
Income v. Leisure
Input versus output incentive schemes
Interview with the 2007 Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson
Invisible Hand and Externalities., The
Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back
Long-term investment by Japanese and American firms
Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I : Observable Actions.
Mechanism design for the environment
Mechanism design : how to implement social goals : discurso de ingreso en la Real Academia de Ciencias Económicas y Financieras, leído el 5 de octubre de 2009 por el académico correspondiente para los Estados Unidos, Excmo.Sr.Dr.D. Eric S. Maskin : discurso de contestación por Jaime Gil Aluja
Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality : Behavior and regulation
Multi-unit Auctions, Price Discrimination and Bundling
Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality.
On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control.
On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts
On the difficulty of attaining distributional goals with imperfect information about consumers
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
On the efficiency of fixed price equilibrium
On the Efficiency of Keynesian Equilibrium
On the fundamental theorems of general equilibrium
On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules
On The Robustness of Majority Rule
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers.
Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms
Optimal reservation price in the Vickery auction
Planning, shortage, and transformation : essays in honor of János Kornai
Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government, The
Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values., The
Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values., The
progress report on Kelly's majority conjectures, A
Public-private partnerships and government spending limits
Rational expectations with imperfect competition : A Bertrand-Edgeworth Example
Rational Expectations with Market Power - The Paradox of the Disadvantageous Tariff on Oil
Recent developments in game theory
Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint
Renegotiation in repeated games
Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players.
Roy Radner and Incentive Theory
Segregation by Skill and the Rise in Inequality.
Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation
Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Innovation
Simple Economics of Research Portfolios., The
Social choice and individual values
Soft budget constraint theories from centralization to the market
Soft budget constraints and transition
Theorem on Utilitarianism., A
Theories of the soft budget-constraint
Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, 1: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs, A
Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs., A
Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles., A
theory of dynamic oligopoly, III, A : Cournot competition
Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey, The
Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature.
Uncertainty and entry deterrence
Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting
Uncertainty within economic models
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint
Unemployment with observable aggregate shocks, 1982:
Unforeseen Contingencies, Property Rights, and Incomplete Contracts.
Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions
Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass, The
value of victory: social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions, The
Voting Schemes for Public Alternatives: Some Notes on Majority Rule
Wage inequality and segregation by skill
walrasian Theory of Money and Barter., A
WHY HAS INEQUALITY INCREASED IN CHINA? TOWARD A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL MATCHING
Why haven't global markets reduced inequality? 2008:
World scientific series in economic theory
애로우의 불가능성 정리
Contributed to or performed: 
MIT Press
World Scientific
Zed Books
Notes: 
Sources: 
VIAF BNC DNB LC NKC NUKAT SUDOC WKD
BOWKER
NTA
OPENL
TEL