sort by
approximate search
1shortlisttitle datasearch history  
results search [or] ISN:000000003153556X | 1 hits
Person
ISNI: 
0000 0000 3153 556X
Name: 
Barberà, S.
Barberà, Salvador
Barberà, Salvador (économiste)
Barberà, Salvadore
Barberà Sández, Salvador
Dates: 
1946-
Creation class: 
a
article
cre
Language material
Manuscript language material
Text
Creation role: 
author
contributor
Related names: 
Alcalde, J.
Alcalde, Jose
Barber?, Salvador
Barber?Author-Email, Salvador
Barber?Author-Name, Salvador
Barbera, S
Barberà, S.
BARBERÀ, Salvador
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) / Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona / Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica
Barrett, C. R.
Berga, Dolors
Bevi?, Carmen
Bevi?Author-Email, Carmen
Bevia, Carmen
Bogomolnaia, A
Bogomolnaia, Anna
Bossert, W.
BOSSERT, Walter
Carmen.Bevia@uab.es
Coelho, Danilo
Consorci Markets, Organizations and Votes in Economics (MOVE)
Dutta, B.
Dutta, Bhaskar
Ehlers, Lars
Ennio, Stacchetti
Faruk, Gul
Gerber, Anke
Grodal, Birgit
Gul, F.
Jackson, Matthew
Jackson, Matthew O
Jackson, Matthew O.
Koopmans, Tjalling Charles
Maschler, M.
MASCHLER, Michael
Masso, J
Masso, J.
Massó, Jordi
Moreno, and Bernardo
Moreno, Bernardo
Neme, A.
Neme, Alejandro
Northwestern University
Pattanaik, P.K.
Pattanaik, Prasanta K
Pattanaik, Prasanta K.
PELEG, B.
Perea, Andrés
Ruiz-Castillo, Javier (1944-)
Salvador, Barbera
salvador.barbera@uab.es
Sen, Arunava
Serizawa, S
Serizawa, S.
Shalev, J.
Shalev, Jonathan
SONNENSCHEIN, H.
Sonnenschein, Hugo
Stacchetti, E.
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques
Valenciano, Federico
van der Stel, H
van der Stel, Hans
Zamir, Shmuel
Zhou, Lin
Titles: 
Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice
Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods, A
Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions
Collective Probabilistic Judgements.
Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203]
Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]
Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects
Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infrastructure Projects
Doctor honoris causa Hugo F. Sonnenschein : discurs llegit a la cerimònia d'investidura celebrada a la sala d'actes de la Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials el dia 22 d'abril de l'any 1994
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
Editor's note
Essays on judgement aggregation and argumentation
Estado y economía : elementos para un debate
Estrategia y elección social
Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings.
Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees.
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
Handbook of utility theory
How to choose a non-controversial list with k names
Implementability via protective equilibria
Incentius i disseny d'institucions: teoria i pràctica d'un economista
Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide?
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ICREA), La
introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions, An
Investigación económica en España, 1990-2000, La : una década de cambios
Invitación a la teoría económica
José Isidoro Morales, precursor ilustrado de la teoría de la elección social : edición facsímil de la Memoria matemática sobre el cálculo de la opinión en las elecciones (1797) y Apéndice (1805)
Lliçons inaugurals
Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation
Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework.
Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance., The
Manipulation of social decision functions
Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
Memorial
Mètodes de decisió col·lectiva: mercats, vots i altres espècies : inauguració del curs acadèmic 1996-1997 : lliçò inaugural
Michael Maschler in Barcelona
Mixture social welfare functions
Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes., A
note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games, A
Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions.
On coalition formation: durable coalition structures
On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
On the ranking of social alternatives
On the rule of k names
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union
original papers : Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms
Pivotal voters : A new proof of arrow's theorem
Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice
Protective behavior in matching models
Protective behaviour in matching models
Ranking sets of objects
Self-Selection Consistent Choices
Self-selection consistent functions
Sesión de investidura de Doctor "Honoris Causa" del Excmo. Sr. Prof. Dr. Don Salvador Barberà Sández
Single-dipped preferences
special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler, A
Stable condorcet rules
Stable voting schemes
Strategy and social choice
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
Strategy-Proof Exchange.
Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences
Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES
Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
Supporting others and the evolution of influence.
Teoría de juegos y métodos de votación
Theorem on Preference Aggregation, A
Three essays on strategy-proofness : choosing intervals and locating public goods
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
Tres ensayos sobre el estado de la ciencia económica y los conceptos de optimalidad y su utilización
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
Universitat i recerca : algunes propostes de política científica
Viajes por Marruecos
Voting by committees under constraints
Voting by quota and commitee
VOTING BY QUOTA AND COMMITTEE.
Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution.
Voyages d'Ali-Bey el Abbassi (Domingo Badia y Leyblich) en Afrique et en Asie
Notes: 
Bibliogr. S. 91-93
Fotokopie
Diss. 1975--Northwestern University, 1975
Sources: 
VIAF B2Q BNC BNE DBC LC
BOWKER
OPENL
TEL