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D'Arcy Hart, Oliver Simon
Hart, O. D.
Hart, Oliver D.
Hart, Oliver S.
Hart, Oliver Simon D'Arcy
Oliver Hart (Amerikaans econoom)
Oliver Hart (amerikansk ekonom)
Oliver Hart (amerikansk økonom)
Oliver Hart (British economist)
Oliver Hart (US-amerikanischer Ökonom)
الیور هارت (اقتصاددان آمریکایی)
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye
Drago, R La Porta
Drago, Rafael La Porta
Grossman, Sanford J
Grossman, Sanford J.
Hardman Moore, John
Hart, Oliver D
Hart, Oliver D.
Harvard University / Department of Economics
Harvard University Department of Economics Affiliation (see also from)
Jaffee, Dwight M
Kreps, David M
La Porta Drago, Rafael
London School of Economics and Political Science Affiliation (see also from)
Maskin, Eric S
Moore, John (1954-)
National Bureau of Economic Research
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
National Bureau of Economic Research Affiliation (see also from)
Vishny, Robert W
Vishny, Robert W.
Winter, Sidney G. (1935-....))
鳥居, 昭夫 (1952-)
Agreeing now to agree later: contracts that rule out but do not rule in
Allocation, information and markets
Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information, The
Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem., An
Banks are where the liquidity is
Bargaining and Strikes.
Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations.
Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics.
Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence
Cooperatives vs. outside ownership
Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives
Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications.
Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, The
Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration., The
Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986)), The
Debt and seniority : an analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management
Debt Enforcement Around the World
Default and renegotiation, 1997:
Default and renegotiation: a dynamic model of debt
Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.)
Different approaches to bankruptcy
Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids
Economics of Bankruptcy Reform (Now published in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol.8, no.3, (1992), pp. 523-546.), The
Firms Contracts And Financial Structure
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.)
Governance of Exchanges: Members Co-operatives Versus Outside Ownership, The
Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership., The
Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).)
Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment.
Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information.
Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation.
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.)
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm.
Inefficient Provision of Liquidity
Kigyō keiyaku kin'yū kōzō
Liquidity and Inefficient Investment
Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features., A
Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities: A Correction.
Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).)
Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).)
Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: A General Model.
Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results.
More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts
New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions - (Now published in European Economics Review, vol.41(3/5), 1997, pp.461-473.), A
new capital regulation for large financial institutions, A
Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points
Norms and the Theory of the Firm
On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies.
On the Application of Portfolio Theory to Depository Financial Intermediaries.
On the design of hierarchies : coordination versus specialization
On the Profitability of Speculation.
One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control
Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).)
Price Destabilizing Speculation (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (october 1986).)
Proper Scope of Government, The : Theory and an Application to Prisons.
proper scope of government theory and an application to prisons, The
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.)
public good is a public good: a theory of corporations, The
Reference points and the theory of the firm
Some Negative Results on the Existence of Comparative Statics Results in Portfolio Theory.
Takeover bids, the free rider problem. -
Takeover bids versus proxy fights in contests for corporate control. -
Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control
Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine
theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies, A
Theory of Contracts, The
theory of corporate financial structure based on the seniority of claims, A
theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital, A
Theory of Firm Scope, A
Unemployment with observable aggregate shocks, 1982:
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MARKET FORECLOSURE.
Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry.
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