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Person
ISNI: 
0000 0000 1992 0772
Name: 
Forges, Françoise
Françoise Forges
Dates: 
1958-
Creation class: 
article
Computer file
cre
Language material
Creation role: 
author
contributor
Related names: 
Barbar, Riham
Biran, Omer
CESifo
DE WOLF , Olivier
De Wolf, Olivier
FORGES , Françoise
Forges, F.
Forges, Françoise
FORGES, FRANÇOISE
Forges, Francoise M
Françoise, FORGES
Heifetz, A.
Heifetz, Aviad
Iehlé, Vincent
Jacques-François, THISSE
KOESSLER, FRÉDÉRIC
Mertens, J. F.
MERTENS, Jean-François
MINELLI , Enrico
Minelli, E.
Minelli, Enrico
Neyman, A.
Orzach, Ram
Peck, James
Serrano, Roberto
Stengel, B. von
Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) / Centre de Recherches en Mathématiques de la Décision (CEREMADE)
Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) / Laboratoire d'Économie de Dauphine (LEDa)
Vida, Péter
Vida, Péter
Vohra, R.
VOHRA, Rajiv
Wolf, O. De
Titles: 
Afriat's theorem for general budget sets.
approach to communication equilibria, An
Approach to Communication Equilibrium, An
Can sunspots replace a mediator ?
cœur d'une économie d'échange en information asymétrique, Le
Collusion dans les enchères : quelques apports des jeux coopératifs.
Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 1)
Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 2)
Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 3)
Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types.
Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory.
Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees
Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values.
Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values.
Correlated equilibria and communication in games.
Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium
Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games.
counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting, A
Différences d’information, solutions concurentielles et stratégies révélatrices
Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices
Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example.
Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization
Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities, The
ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects., The
ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities., The
ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game., The
ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game, The
Ex post individually rational trading mechanisms
Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments.
Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
Game Theory and Industrial Economics. An Introduction
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics.
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
Incentive Compatible Core of a Quasi-Linear Economy, The
Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey
Infinitely repeated games with incomplete information
Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la Théorie des Mécanismes
Long persuasion games.
Multistage communication with and without verifiable types
Negotiation without a deadline:a job market example
Non-zero sum repeated games and information transmission
note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies, A
note on the incentive compatible core, A
On Strategic Equilibria and Rational Choice
Posterior efficiency
Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, A
Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations.
Repeated games of incomplete information: non-zero-sum
Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information.
Sunspot equilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept
Trading Games With Asymmetric Information
Trading mechanisms in the presence of externalities.
Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (Strategic Information Transmission and Certification)
Universal mechanisms.
Notes: 
Sources: 
NTA
OPENL
TEL