sort by
approximate search
1shortlisttitle datasearch history  
results search [or] ISN:0000000063094201 | 1 hits
Person
ISNI: 
0000 0000 6309 4201
Name: 
Jensen, M. C.
Jensen, Michael
Jensen, Michael C.
Michael Jensen (American economist)
Michael Jensen (Amerikaans econoom)
Michael Jensen (amerikanischer Ökonom)
Michael Jensen (amerikansk ekonom)
Michael Jensen (amerikansk økonom)
Дженсен, Майкл
مایکل ینسن (اقتصاددان آمریکایی)
Dates: 
1939-
Creation class: 
article
Computer file
Language material
Projected medium
Text
txt
Creation role: 
author
editor
Related names: 
BAKER, G.P.
Baker, George P
Bennington, George A
Elman, Colin
Fama, Eugene F
Fama, Eugene F.
Fuller, Joseph
HALL, ROBERT E.
Harvard University / Harvard Business School / Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit
Heckling, William H.
HIRSHLEIFER, JACK
Holderness, Clifford G.
JENSEN, M.C.
Jensen, Michael
Jensen, Michael C
JENSEN, MICHAEL C.
Kay, John
Latimier, Patrick
Long, John Jr
Martin, John
Meckling, William H
Meckling, William H.
MURPHY, K.J.
Murphy, Kevin J
Murphy, Kevin J.
Naples, Ron
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Pitt, Harvey
Rousseau, Aurélie
Ruback, Richard S.
Smith, Clifford Jr
Smith, Clifford W.
Social Science Research Network
University of Chicago
WAMER, J.B.
Warner, Jerold B.
Wruck, Karen Hopper
Zak, Paul J.
Zimmerman, Jerold L.
Titles: 
Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers.
Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance, The
Agency Problems and Residual Claims.
Analysis of alternative standing doctrines
Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors
Capital Market as a Growth Engine, The
Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence
CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But How
CEO incentives-its not how much you pay, but how.
Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory.
CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE
distribution of power among corporate managers, share-holders, and directors Symposium [held at the University of Rochester on May 28-30, 1987], The
distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders, and directors, The
ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION
Editorial
financiers, The : the world of the great Wall Street investment banking houses
Foundations of organizational strategy
free cash flow theory of takeovers: a financial perspective on mergers and acquisitions and the economy, The
Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game
Management compensation and the managerial labor market
Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, The
market for corporate control, The : The scientific evidence
Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems., The
Modern theory of corporate finance, c1984:, The
Moral Markets : The Critical Role of Values in the Economy
NATURE OF MAN, THE
Organizational forms and investment decisions
Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process
PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE PERIOD 1945–1964, THE
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives.
Preface
Putting integrity into finance theory and practice : a positive approach
Random Walks and Technical Theories: Some Additional Evidence.
Realism reader
Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination.
Risk, The Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios.
Science, specific knowledge, and total quality management
SELF-INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY
Separation of Ownership and Control.
Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency
SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Specific Knowledge and Divisional Performance Measurement
Studies in the theory of capital markets.
Symposium on the market for corporate control : the scientific evidence
Takeover Controversy: The Restructuring of Corporate America, The
Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences.
theory of the firm, A : governance, residual claims, and organizational forms
theory of the firm governance, residual claims, and organizational forms, A
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Two Key Principles Behind Effective TQM Programs, The
Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function
Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function
Woodfuel productivity of agroforestry systems in Asia : a review of current knowledge
Contributed to or performed: 
BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT -TAMPA-
JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE
Notes: 
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1968
Sources: 
VIAF DNB LC LNB NSK NUKAT SUDOC WKD
BOWKER
NTA
OPENL
ZETO