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Person
ISNI: 
0000 0000 8357 7550
Name: 
Nisan, N.
Nisan, Noam
Noam Nisan
Noam Nisan (Computer scientist)
Noam Nisan (informaticus uit Israël)
Noam Nisan (israelischer Informatiker)
נעם ניסן
Dates: 
born 1961-01-01
Creation class: 
article
Computer file
cre
Language material
Text
txt
Creation role: 
author
editor
redactor
Related names: 
Babaioff, Moshe
Bikhchandani, Sushil
Blumrosen, Liad
Center for the Study of Rationality Jerusalem Affiliation (see also from)
Chatterji, Shurojit
Dobzinski, Shahar
Feldman, Michal
Friedgut, Ehud
Hart, Sergiu
Hebrew University Jerusalem Affiliation (see also from)
Hebrew University of Jerusalem / Center for the Study of Rationality
Kalai, Gil
Kushilevitz, Eyal
Lavi, Ron
Lehmann, Benny
Lehmann, Daniel
Mu'alem, Ahuva
Mu’alem, Ahuva
Nisan, Noam
Papadimitriou, Christos H. (1949-....))
Pavlov, Elan
Płoski, Zdzisław
Ronen, Amir
Schapira, Michael
Schocken, Shimon (19..-....))
Segal, Ilya
Shocken, Shimon
Tardos, Éva
Universiṭah ha-ʻIvrit bi-Yerushalayim. Merkaz leheqer ha-razyonaliyyut weha-hahlatot ha-interaqtiviyyot
University of California, Berkeley
Titles: 
Algorithmic game theory
Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial agency
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Communication complexity
communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices*, The
Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions, An
Elections can be manipulated often
elements of computing systems building a modern computer from first principles, The
Elementy systemów komputerowych : budowa nowoczesnego komputera od podstaw
experimental evaluation of bidders' behavior in AD auctions, An
Globally distributed computation over the Internet - the POPCORN project
How good are simple mechanisms for selling multiple goods?
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
menu-size complexity of auctions, The
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions I: Demand Queries
On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions II: Ascending Auctions
POPCORN market-an online market for computational resources, The
POPCORN market. Online markets for computational resources
query complexity of correlated equilibria, The
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem
Using hard problems to create pseudorandom generators, c1991:
Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
Notes: 
Revision of the author's Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 1988
Sources: 
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