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Person
ISNI: 
0000 0001 0911 3763
Name: 
Congleton, R. D.
Congleton, Roger
Congleton, Roger D.
Congleton, Roger Douglas
Congleton, Roger Douglas (Vollstaendiger Name)
Douglas Congleton, Roger
Roger D. Congleton
Roger D. Congleton (American economist)
Roger D. Congleton (Amerikaans econoom)
コングルトン, ロジャー・D.
コングレトン, ロジャー
Dates: 
1951-
Creation class: 
article
cre
Language material
Text
txt
Creation role: 
author
contributor
editor
redactor
Related names: 
Bacaria, Jordi
Bennett, Randall W
Bose, Feler
Buchanan, James M
Buchanan, James M.
Buchanan, James MacGill (1919-)
Buchanan, James McGill (1919-)
Clarkson University Affiliation (see also from)
Congleton, R.D.
Congleton, Roger
Congleton, Roger D
Congleton, Roger D.
Fudulu, Paul
George Mason University / Economics Department
George Mason University / James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy / Center for the Study of Public Choice
George Mason University Department of Economics Affiliation (see also from)
Hillman, Arye L. (1947-...)
Kato, Hiroshi (1926-2013)
Konrad, Kai A.
Konrad, Kai Andreas
Kyriacou, Andreas
Lee, Sanghack
Shughart, William F II
Steunenberg, Bernard
Swedenborg, Birgitta (1941-)
Sweetser, Wendell
Tollison, Robert D.
Vanberg, Viktor J.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
West Virginia University / Department of Economics
West Virginia University College of Business and Economics Affiliation (see also from)
加藤, 寬 (1926-2013)
Titles: 
40 years of research on rent seeking.
America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective
Applications: rent seeking in practice
Avinash K. Dixit, The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective
Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy
Committees and rent-seeking effort
constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock, The
Coping with unpleasant surprises in a complex world: Is rational choice possible in a world with positive information costs?
Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90|GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95|GBP 20.95 (paper)., The
Dark Side of the Force, The : Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory
Democracy in America: Labor Mobility, Ideology, and Constitutional Reform
Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence
Dennis C. Mueller : Reason, religion, and liberal democracy
economic analysis of rent seeking
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS, POST-SAMPLE FORECASTS OF THE KRAMER EQUATIONS
economic role of a work ethic, The
Efficient mercantilism? Revenue-maximizing monopoly policies as Ramsey taxation
Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games
Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity
From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution : The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments
Globalization of Politics: Rational Choice and the Internationalization of Public Policy, The
Growing up with The Calculus of Consent
growth of social security: Electoral push or political pull?, The
Growth Of Social Security: Electrical Push Or Political, The
Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit
Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society
Improving democracy through constitutional reform : some Swedish lessons
In defense of ignorance: On the significance of a neglected form of incomplete information
incumbency dilemma and rent extraction by legislators, The
Information, special interests, and single-issue voting
Informational limits to democratic public policy : The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance
International Public Goods and Agency Problems in Treaty Organizations
Monitoring Rent-Seeking Managers: Advantages of Diffuse Ownership.
Mutual Advantages of Coercion and Exit within Private Clubs and Treaty Organizations: Towards a Logic of Voluntary Association
n94118648
Nicolaus Tideman : Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice
Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions
On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy
On the evolution of organizational government
On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State : Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs
On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts
On the political economy of state highway expenditures: Some evidence of the relative performance of alternative public choice models
On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009
On the rationality of mutually immiserating coercion
Overview of the Contractarian Public Finance of James Buchanan, An
Perfecting parliament : constitutional reform, liberalism, and the rise of Western democracy
Political Deadlocks and Distributional Information: The Value of the Veil.
political economy of environmental protecion analysis and evidence
political economy of environmental protection: analysis and evidence, The
Political Economy of Gordon Tullock, The
Political efficiency and equal protection of the law
Political Institutions and Pollution Control.
Politics by principle, not interest : toward nondiscriminatory democracy
Politics of Government Growth, The
Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion.
Rationality, Morality, and Exit
Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising
Rento shikingu no keizai riron.
rise of the modern welfare state, ideology, institutions and income security: analysis and evidence, The
Risk-Averse Taxpayers and the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort: Law Enforcement or Leviathan? Some Empirical Evidence
role of information in choice, The ; toward an economic theory of knowledge and decision making
ROLE OF INFORMATION IN CHOICE: TOWARD AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND DECISION MAKING, THE
stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking, The
story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe, The
story of Katrina, The : New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe
Terrorism, Interest-Group Politics, and Public Policy : Curtailing Criminal Modes of Political Speech
Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement, A
Thoughts on Daniel Shapiro's “Is the welfare state justified?”
Voter Discernment and Candidate Entry in Pluralitarian Election.
Why local governments do not maximize profits : on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance
レントシーキングの経済理論
Contributed to or performed: 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
INDEPENDENT REVIEW -OAKLAND-
KYKLOS -BERNE-
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS
PUBLIC CHOICE
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Notes: 
Bibliogr. S. 146-152
Fotokopie
Diss. 1978--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1978
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