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Person
ISNI: 
0000 0003 8251 1738
Name: 
Hideshi Itō
Itō, Hideshi
Itoh, Hideshi
イトウ, ヒデシ
伊藤, 秀史
伊藤秀史
Dates: 
1959-
Creation class: 
article
Language material
Text
Creation role: 
author
Related names: 
Baker, George
Daido, Kohei
Hayashida, Osamu
Hideshi, Itoh
Hitotsubashi University / Graduate School of Commerce and Management
Hoshi, Takeo
Ichimura, Hidehiko
Ishiguro, S.
Ishiguro, Shingo
Itoh, H
Itoh, H.
Itoh, Hideshi
Kikutani, Tatsuya
Morita, Hodaka
Stanford University Graduate School of Business 1988
Teruyama, H
市村, 英彦
林田, 修
池田, 新介
沼上, 幹 (1960-)
照山, 博司 (1962-)
照山博司
田中, 一弘 (1966-)
藤本, 隆宏 (1955-)
西口, 敏宏 (1952-)
Titles: 
Chingin, shōshin shisutemu to doryoku insentibu : howaito karā rōdōsha e no ankēto chōsa ni yoru bunseki
Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing
Complementarities among authority, accountability, and monitoring: Evidence from Japanese business groups
Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective.
Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M-Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?
Effort Incentives : Evidence from Japanese Data.
Essays on internal organization of the firm
Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem
Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the threat-point effect
Games,strategies,and managers.
Gendai keizaigaku no chōryū.
GUEST EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
Hitasura yomu ekonomikusu : Rido mi fasuto.
Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations.
Information processing capacities of the firm
Insentibu sekkei no keizaigaku : Keiyaku riron no ōyō bunseki
Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production.
Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis
Keiei senryaku no gēmu riron
Kenkyūsha sōran, 1996:
Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents.
Moral Hazard and Size Trade in Agency Contracts
Nihon kigyō henkakuki no sentaku
Nihon no kigyō shisutemu
Organizational innovation and corporate performance
Organizational Innovation and Firm Performance
Pygmalion and Galatea Effects: An Agency Model with Reference-Dependent Preferences and Applications to Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, The
Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences, The
Rīdingusu sapuraiyā shisutemu : Atarashii kigyōkan kankei o tsukuru
Theories of International Outsourcing and Integration, The : A Theoretical Overview from the Perspective of Organizational Economics
インセンティブ設計の経済学 : 契約理論の応用分析
ひたすら読むエコノミクス : READ ME 1ST
リーディングスサプライヤー・システム : 新しい企業間関係を創る
契約の経済理論
日本の企業システム
日本企業変革期の選択
現代の経営理論
現代経済学の潮流.
経営戦略のゲーム理論 : 交涉・契約・入札の戦略分析
賃金・昇進システムと努力インセンティブ : ホワイト・カラー労働者へのアンケート調查による分析
Notes: 
Typescript
"March 1988."
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 1988
Sources: 
BOWKER
OPENL